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THE PENNSYLVANIA FIDUCIARIES ACT OF 1949.
Two years ago, Pennsylvania gathered together its rules relating to
the administration of decedents' estates, minors' estates, trust estates, and
the like, in a new Fiduciaries Act.' In many respects the Act is declaratory
of previously existing law, principally the 1917 Fiduciaries Act 2 and its
amendments, but there are significant changes. Many of the problems left
unsettled, or newly raised, spring from what the Act has left unsaid. It is
uncertain if the Act is substitutional or additional, whether it states the
whole of the law relating to fiduciaries, or whether it leaves unaltered those
areas and rules which it does not specifically deal with, or deals with only
in part. The Act's repealer provisions excepts enough previous legislation
to raise a doubt as to its nature and scope. Because of this doubt, and
because of the broad equitable powers of the Orphans' Courts, many of
the provisions of the Act are open to broad interpretation. If the courts
are loath to part with some of the traditional rules applicable to decedents'
estates, such as the judicial power to restrain sales made by a personal
representative, 4 and the order of abatement of a decedent's property, 5 the
changes made by the Act may not be as effective as they purport to be.
It is not the purpose of this symposium, however, to dwell at length
on the nature and scope of the Act, or deal with its problems on a conceptual basis.6 Where such an analysis is believed helpful it will be made
briefly, but the authors of the comments below are more concerned with
practical problems raised by some of the provisions of the Act, both by the
language itself, and by the effect of that language in the light of the preexisting peculiarities of Pennsylvania's law of decedents' estates. Rather
than attempting a definitive study of the Act at this early date, certain
specific areas have been selected with an eye to their practical importance
and to the magnitude of the changes made. 7 It is sought first to outline
the effect of the Act's provisions in these areas and, secondly, to deal with
the problems that are raised with respect to them.
1. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 320.101 et seq. (Purdon, 1950). Hereinafter, the
Act will be referred to by section number only, e.g., § 101, § 545.
2. Formerly, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 321 et seq. (Purdon, 1941). Hereinafter,
this act will be referred to as Act of 1917, followed by the Purdon section number.
3. § 1401.
4. See text infra beginning at note 121.

5. See text infra beginning at note 142.
6. It is a matter of doubt, for instance, whether the Act abolishes, or merly supplants, the concept of the lien of creditors on decedents' real property. See notes 9
and 86 infra. Regardless of the answer, creditors have certain remedies, by whatever
name they may be called. The Lien concept is only of importance where no such

remedy is specifically given. See notes 86 and 119 infra and text.
7. The Law Review is greatly indebted to Philip Bregy, Esquire one of the
Commissioners who framed the Act, professor at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School, and member of the Philadelphia bar, for his invaluable assistance in

aiding us in the selection of problems for discussion and in their presentation.
(1164)
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Historical Note
In dealing with the administration of decedents' estates, the 1949 Act

represents a desire to simplify that administration, principally by an assimilation of real and personal property. In so doing, the Act has made a
fundamental change in the Pennsylvania law of decedents' estates.
Pennsylvania imported this branch of its law from England, where the
law governing the devolution of real property grew up under different rules
and in a different system of courts than the law governing the devolution of
personalty. The passage of realty was handled by the common law courts,
and land passed directly from the decedent to his heir or devisee without a
process of administration. The heir established his title in an ordinary
action in the common law courts; the devisee had to establish the proper
execution of the will, there being no probate proceeding whereby the validity of the will could be conclusively established at common law. Real
property acquired by the testator after the execution of the will could not
pass by that will, even under a residuary devise, because a devise of land
was thought of as operating at the date of execution, subject to postponement of operation until the testator's death. Land could not be sold for
the payment of debts, other than specialty debts, unless the will so
specified.
Personal property, on the other hand, was under the jurisdiction of the
ecclesiastical courts. It passed to the personal representative of the decedent, who distributed it to the legatees or those entitled to take by
intestacy, after discharging the debts of the decedent. The probating of
the will was conclusive as to a bequest of personalty, and a will of personal property was construed to take effect from the date of the testator's
death, allowing after-acquired property to pass under it.8
In several respects Pennsylvania had broken away from the English
system by assimilating the rules of realty to those of personalty prior to
the 1949 Act. As early as the Act of May 31, 1693, all lands were made
liable for the payment of debts. 9 The Act of April 10, 1833, provided
that after-acquired realty should pass by a general devise.10 This was
extended by the Act of June 4, 1879, which provided that wills should be
construed to speak and take effect as if executed immediately before the
testator's death, as to both realty and personalty. 11 By the end of the nineteenth century probate of a will was conclusive as to both realty and per8. See LEACH, CASES ON WILLS 1-5, 141-142 (2d ed. 1949); MECHEM AND
ATKINSON, CASES ON WILLS 457-461 (3d ed. 1947).
9. See LADNER, CONVEYANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA 395 (2d ed. 1941). The provisions of the earlier statutes that a decedent's realty was subject to sale for the payment of debts not satisfied out of personalty were construed to place a lien on the
land. Even in the hands of a bona fide purchaser from an heir or devisee, the land
was subject to the claims of an unpaid creditor. Morris, Lessee v. Smith, 1 Yeates
238 (Pa. 1793). For the possible application of the lien theory under the 1949 Act,
see note 86 infra and text.
10. P.L. 249, § 10.
11. P.L. 88, § 1.
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sonalty unless attacked by an appeal from probate.' 2 As to intestate succession, the Intestate Act of 1917 13 removed the last vestiges of the old
distinction in that area by providing for inheritance of both real and personal property in accordance with the scheme for the distribution of personal property as found in the English statute of Distribution of 1670.14
The assimilation was only partial, however. Although land was an
asset for the payment of debts in Pennsylvania as early as the seventeenth
century, before the Act of 1949 it was not an asset under control of
the administrator except by order 'of the Orphans' Court; nor was it
handled by the executor unless control of it was given either by will or
court order.15 Under the new Act all real estate, except that occupied by
an heir or devisee, is given to the possession of the personal representative
without the need for court authority. In the excepted cases the court may
direct him to take possession if necessary.' 6 The personal representative
may lease any property which he is entitled to possess. The personal
representative is also given the power to sell all real estate except that specifically devised without order of court.' 7 As under former practice he
may sell property specifically devised under court order.' 8 Because of the
broad powers given the personal representative provision is made for restraint of improvident sale.' 9 The powers of the personal representative
over realty continue until the decree of distribution, which follows the filing
and auditing of an account, much as has heretofore been done in the
case of personal property 20
Despite the broad powers over real estate given the personal representative, this Act does not go as far toward complete assimilation as the
English Administration of Estates Act,21 which provides that realty as
well as personalty shall pass to the personal representative. Under the
Fiduciaries Act of 1949 legal title to personalty passes to the personal
representative 22 and legal title to realty passes to the heir or devisee, subTwo reasons have been adject to the powers of the representative.2
vanced to explain why title to realty was not vested in the personal representative. First, if title to realty were given initially to the personal representative, there would be questions as to the marketability of title in the
case of a small estate which did not pass through administration. Even in
12. PA. STAT. ANN., tit 20, § 1886 (Purdon, 1930).
13. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 1.3, 1.4 (Purdon, 1950).

For comment, see

BREGY, PENNSYLVANIA INTESTATE, WILLS AND ESTATE AcT oF 1947, 155 (1949).

14. 22 and 23 CHARLES II, c. 10.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Act of 1917, § 551.
§ 501.
§ 542.
§ 541.
§ 543.
§§ 731-736.
15 GEO. V, c. 23 (1925).
§ 103.
§ 104.
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the present Act, however, the small estate has been given special consideration. 24 This could be done under a system of total assimilation. A
less persuasive reason for retaining the distinction is that title searchers
are used to having title pass directly to the heir or devisee. While there
may be no sound reason for retaining this distinction, still there appears
to be no real need to abolish it at the present time. Under the new Act
'the powers of the personal representative seem adequate for efficient
administration.
The Application of the Act to Revocable Trusts
Generally speaking, the Act is designed to take effect on January 1,
1950. The draftsmen of the Act determined, however, that certain sections of Article IX, Trust Estates, should apply only to testamentary or
irrevocable trusts created on or after the effective date of the Act, but should
apply to revocable trusts whenever created. 2 5 Briefly, the sections provide for majority control by the trustees, 26 power of the trustees to
sell the res of the trust,27 power of the court to grant an option to
sell, 28 and the right of the trustees to pay a minor's income directly to
the minor.2 9 The Commissioners, in their comments, indicate that the
rather peculiar distinction was prompted by a fear of running afoul of the
constitutional provision protecting vested rights5 0 The excepted sections
are those which most radically change the rules of administration. That
the fears of the Committee were well-founded has been repeatedly pointed
24. § 615. In England, there has long been a total assimilation of realty and
personalty in the administration of decedents' estates. The Land Transfer Act of
1897 allowed probate of a will which disposed only of realty and provided that real
as well as personal property should vest in the personal representative and pass to
heirs and devisees only by assent or conveyance of the personal representative. These
provisions were continued in the Administration of Estates Act of 1925. The latter
also assimilated the rules of intestate succession of real and personal property.
MEcHE & ATKINSON, CASES ON WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION 460 (1947).
25. § 105: "Effective Date-This act shall take effect on the first day of January,
one thousand nine hundred and fifty, subject to the following exceptions: . . .
(2) Trust Estates. Sections 949 entitled Disagreement Among Trustees, 961 entitled Power to Sell, 963 entitled Order of Court, insofar as it authorizes the court
to approve the grant of an option, and 984 entitled Disposition of Minor's Income,
shall apply to testamentary trusts and irrevocable trusts only if becoming effective
on or after that day but shall apply to revocable trusts whenever created. As to
testamentary trusts and irrevocable trusts effective before that day, the existing laws
on the topics included within such sections or designated portions thereof shall remain in effect."
Subsection 3 of § 105 makes similar provisions relating to Subsection (a) of
§ 1045 entitled "Guardian Named in Conveyance." The instant discussion is limited
to subsection (2) of § 105 but it is believed that the principles here involved apply
equally to Subsection (3).
26. 3949.

27. § 961.
28. §963.
29. §984.
30. Commissioter's Comntent to § 105 (2) "The exceptions listed are instances
where it is believed a retroactive application would disturb vested property rights."
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The Supreme Court has indicated
up in recent Pennsylvania decisions.'
a very unfavorable attitude toward the retroactive application of statutes
which may disturb "vested rights." 32 The extreme protection indicated in
these decisions would seem to cast some doubts upon the constitutionality
of the present Act even when the retroactivity of the indicated sections is
limited to revocable trusts. An examination of the cases in the field is
here attempted in an effort to indicate the arguments both for and against
the application to revocable trusts and to give some reasonable basis upon
which to predict the result if such a question should arise.
Pennsylvania has a long and somewhat oscillating case history on the
question of what type of retroactive legislation may or may not be imposed by the legislature.3 3 It has been said repeatedly, however, and
adopted as the position of the present court,3 that a statute which impairs
a vested right is unconstitutional as applied retrospectively.35 An analysis
of the interests created by a revocable trust is the first step in determining
constitutionality.
The quality of the interest of the beneficiaries of revocable trusts has
most frequently arisen in cases involving widow's rights. Normally the
widow is seeking to have the trust res declared a part of her husband's
estate for the purpose of her taking against the will. The court has
repeatedly decided that such a trust, unless the trustee is constituted a
mere agent of the settlor, is an inter vivos trust and the interest of the
remaindermen is a vested interest 30 In this regard the court has frequently found it necessary to define the nature of the power of revocation.
It has consistently been held that the power, unexercised, is to be treated
as though it never existed.37 Professor Scott has stated that "the reservation of a power of revocation does not prevent the creation of a trust in
the lifetime of the settlor, and the beneficiary at once acquires a future
interest, although it is an interest subject to be divested by the exercise
of the power. The death of the settlor is not a condition precedent to
the vesting of the interest in the beneficiary." 38
31. McKean Estate, 366 Pa. 192, 77 A.2d 447 (1951); Crawford Estate, 362
Pa. 458, 67 A.2d 124 (1949) ; Borsch Estate, 362 Pa. 581, 67 A.2d 119 (1949).
32. 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 864 (1951).
33. Compare Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa. 479 (1871), and Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa.
256 (1851), with Canovaro v. Order of St. Augustine, 326 Pa. 76, 191 Atl. 140
(1937) ; Grim v. Weissenberg School District, 57 Pa. 433 (1868).
34. McKean Estate, 366 Pa. 192, 77 A.2d 447 (1951).
35. E.g., Willcox v. Penn Mutual, 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d 521 (1947) ; Palairet's
Appeal, 67 Pa. 479 (1871); Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa. 256 (1851).
36. E.g., Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 21 Atl. 809 (1891); Dickerson's Appeal,
115 Pa. 198, 8 Atl. 64 (1886). These cases and many others frequently cited are
expressly concerned with determining whether the trust is inter vivos or testamentary, but the Pennsylvania court views them as also holding that the beneficiary
has a vested interest. See McKean Estate, 366 Pa. 192, 77 A.2d 447 (1951).
37. See Dolan's Estate, 279 Pa. 582, 589, 124 Atl. 176, 178 (1924) ; Lines v.
Lines, .rpra note 36 at 167, 21 Atl. at 810, 811; Dickerson's Appeal, supra note 36
at 210, 8 Atl. at 69. See 99 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 879 (1951).
38. 1 ScoT, TRUSTS 337, 338 (1939).
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The issue has also arisen in a line of inheritance tax cases in which
the court has again viewed the beneficiaries' interest as vested, but, by
reason of the tax statute, has held the fund taxable at the death of the
settlor.39 These cases in no wise weaken the firm conceptual position that
the mere reservation of the power to revoke does not alter the vested
character of the remainderman's interest. Nor do they necessarily indicate that the Pennsylvania court will abandon the conceptual position in
other cases. The tax is imposed upon the theory that the settlor has not
parted with full control of the res.40 To find an interest taxable, therefore,
is not to find that it has not vested in the sense that it cannot be retroactively impaired.41
With regard to the settlor's interest, as recently as 1949 the Pennsylvania court has held that the settlor of a spendthrift trust has-a vested
property right to have the trust carried out as directed by him. Hence
a statute allowing the life tenant to release his interest to the remainderIrrespective of whether
man was unconstitutional as applied retroactively.4
or not the soundness of this decision is open to question,13 it stands as a
possible analogy to the situation under discussion.
Even though the interests of beneficiary and settlor are vested, the
question remains whether they are disturbed sufficiently by section 105 to
render the Act unconstitutional in this respect. With regard to the beneficiaries' interest, the retroactive application of the Principal and Income
Act was recently held unconstitutional by reason of its affecting the vested
rights of the beneficiary. 44 In that case, however, the effect of the legislation was to affect substantively the return to be realized. The classic
formulation of the policy of the due process clause, as applied to vested
rights, was being violated. 45 Property which, prior to the act, would have
gone to A was, under the new provisions, being given to B. On the other
hand, the Revised Price Act of 1917, which authorized the court to confirm the sale, mortgaging of, or partitioning of land acquired by descent
or will, was held constitutional, even though some of the persons owning
39. Todd's Trust, 358 Pa. 530, 58 A.2d 135 (1948); Glosser's Trust, 355 Pa.
210, 49 A.2d 401 (1946); Lines Estate, 142 Pa. 149, 21 Atl. 809 (1893); but cf.
Dolan's Estate, supra note 37.
40. See cases cited note 39 supra.
41. "It is clear . . . that, even though the property has been delivered to a
trustee, and vested remainders given to the bneficiaries, if the donor himself continues
as beneficiary until his death . . . the interest of the reminderman does not take
effect until the donor's death and is, therefore, subject to the transfer inheritance
tax." Glosser Trust, 355 Pa. 210, 215, 48 A.2d 401, 404 (1946) (emphasis added).
42. Borsch Estate, 362 Pa. 581, 67 A.2d 119 (1949); see Bonsall Estate, 65
D. & C. 251, 266-270 (Pa. 1948).
43. See 98 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 249 (1949).
44. Crawford Estate, 362 Pa. 458, 67 A.2d 124 (1949) (the Act in question would
have altered the existing rule on apportionment of income between life tenant and remainderman).
45. For a full discussion, see Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights,
5 Tax. L. REv. 231 (1927), 6 Tax. L. Rxv. 409 (1928) ; Smead, The Ride Against
Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Primciple of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. Rav. 775
(1936).
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interests in the land objected to the sale. 46 In such cases the vested interest is not deemed disturbed. The "property right" of the beneficiary
affected by the 1949 act is no more than a right in rules governing the
administration of the trust. It is submitted that the retroactive application
of such changes as the majority control by the trustees, the power to
sell the res, the power of the court to grant an option to sell, and the
other changes in administration made applicable to revocable, but not
irrevocable, trusts, do not deprive the beneficiary of a vested right. None
of these changes allow property to be taken from A and given to B, and
they are little more than procedural changes in the administration of trusts.
A similar determination must be made with regard to the vested right
of the settlor, and it is at this point that the scheme of the Effective Date
section of the present Act becomes most apparent and should serve to distinguish it from other retroactive legislation. In each of the sections, save
one, 47 the words "unless otherwise provided by the trust instrument" are
employed. The impact of this provision is that the settlor can otherwise
provide if he so desires. Clearly, in testamentary and irrevocable trusts
the settlor has no power to change the trust terms. Hence, if it was his
wish in bestowing his property that there should be unanimous trustee
action, and the applicable law is subsequently changed, the trust so administered would be retroactively altered by Section 949.48 In a revocable
49
trust, however, if the settlor has the right to modify as well as to revoke
any objections he might have to the administrative changes here imposed
can be removed by exercise of the power of revocation. This distinction,
it is submitted, should be very persuasive in a decision determining the
constitutionality of this Act. To give this distinction legal effect, however,
will entail the repudiation of some of the language heretofore employed by
the court in defining the nature of a power of revocation. It has been
said that the settlor has the sole control of the power and until it is exercised, it is to be treated as non-existent.50 The retroactive application of
46. Jefferies' Estate, 37 Lanc. 435 (Pa. 1921). But see Van Voorhis Estate, 355
Pa. 82, 49 A.2d 257 (1946).
47. § 963 is effective even when expressly directed otherwise by the settlor. It is
believed that the section, insofar as it gives the power to grant an option to sell,
which is the part which is involved in § 105, is not a sufficient change of existing
law to subject it to constitutional attack.
48. "§ 949 . . . (a) Decision of Majority. If a dispute shall arise among trustees, the decision of the majority shall control unless otherwise provided in the trust
instrument. ....

"

49. The RESTATEMENT oF TRUSTS § 331, Comment g, states that ordinarily "a
general power to revoke the trust will be interpreted as authorizing the settlor not
only to revoke . . . but also to modify. . . ." The question has not, however, been
decided by any Pennsylvania case found by the writer.
50. "But the right to revoke, unexercised, is a dead thing. Its presence in a
deed does not alter the character of the instrument or estate granted; to all intents
and purposes title and possession pass just as effectively as any deed or grant could
make it, continuing in that state so long as the power of revocation lies dormant."
Dolan's Estate, 279 Pa. 582, 589, 124 Atl. 176, 178 (1924). "The power of revocation reserved in the deed, having never been exercised, was precisely as if it had
never existed." Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 167, 21 At. 809, 810, 811 (1891).
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the Act will force him to exercise his right to modify or suffer a change
in the administrative requirements of the trust. It is submitted, however,
that no great harm will result from taking cognizance of the unexercised
power for the purpose of upholding the constitutionality of Section 105
of this Act. The power of modification should be sufficient to save the
Act from impairing the settlor's vested interest. 51
If, however, the Pennsylvania court should hold that the power to
revoke does not include the power to modify, the suggested distinction is
of less validity. If the settlor is forced to effect a conveyance to himself
and then back again to the trustees, merely to insert clauses in the trust
instrument avoiding the changes imposed by the statute, the effect upon
his vested interest could be a severe and costly one. It must be noted,
also, that even if the power to revoke includes the power to modify, there
are considerations which might lead the court, in a given case, to find
Section 105 unconstitutional. A case might well arise where a settlor,
ignorant of both the Act and the handling of the trust estate by the trustees, finds that the trustees relying on Section 105 have by majority vote
sold the res of the trust. If such a fait accompli cannot be altered by exercise of the power of revocation, a court might held that in such a case the
application of Section 105 to a revocable trust resulted in a deprivation of
a vested right. The customary talk about an unexercised power of revocation being tantamount to no power would then have special meaning.
There remains another interest which must be considered in this regard. Does the trustee have a vested interest which cannot be retroactively
impaired? It has been held in Pennsylvania that a trustee himself has a
vested right when appointed by testator's will and that in addition he is
the guardian of the vested rights of the beneficiaries and that these rights
cannot be swept away without due process of law. 2 Other Pennsylvania
cases have held that for. some purposes a trustee has no such rights. 3
Does a minority trustee of a revocable trust created prior to the act have
a property right in the law of unanimity which is taken away by the provision for majority control? Whether or not the Pennsylvania cases are
interpreted as dictating an affirmative answer, other jurisdictions most
51. There is some precedent to be found for this position in cases dealing with
the retroactivity of the inheritance tax statute. See Commonwealth v. Linderman's
Estate, 340 Pa. 289, 291, 17 A.2d 397, 399 (1940) ; Denniston's Estate, 325 Pa. 453,
191 Atl. 39 (1937).
52. Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. 86 (1847) ; see Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa. 256 (1851)
(executor is said to have an inviolable interest which cannot be retroactively impaired).
53. See, e.g., Canovaro v. Brothers of Order of Hermits of St. Augustine, 326
Pa. 76, 191 Atl. 140 (1937) (statute making Church property subject to control
of members as trustees gave no vested right to trustees which would be impaired by
subsequent statutory change), In re Freeman's Estate, 181 Pa. 405, 37 Atl. 591 (1897)
(statute authorizing sales of trust property where trustees unreasonably withhold
consent is constitutional). See also cases in which a trustee is held to have no
right to appeal: In re Derbyshire's Estate, 306 Pa. 278, 159 Atl. 439 (1932), In re
Behringer's Estate, 265 Pa. 111, 108 Atl. 414 (1919).
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vehemently declare he does not.54 It is submitted that this problem might
also be met with emphasis upon the settlor's power to modify the revocable
trust. Again, however, it should be pointed out that the court could very
well find that the power of revocation, unexercised, is of no consequence,
and hence, treat a revocable trust precisely as though it were irrevocable
for the purpose of determining vested interests.
If the court should so find, then the distinction made by the committee would be rendered useless. Precisely the same risk of interfering
with vested rights would be encountered if applied to all types of trusts.
It would seem that if the power to revoke is of no effect, then the interests
involved in each type of trust would be of the same quality. The result,
under those conditions, must be either that the committee was overly
cautious, and need not have excepted any of the sections, or, that they
were not sufficiently cautious, resulting in the unconstitutionality of the
Act in so far as it applies retroactively to revocable trusts. 55
Marketability of Title
The purported assimilation of realty and personalty in decedents'
estates has its most significant impact on the transfer of decedents' real
estate. The following two parts of this article deal respectively with the
inevitably conflicting interests of the recipient of such property on the one
hand, and of decedents' creditors on the other, which interests are affected
by the same provisions of the Act. A comparison with the 1917 Act
demonstrates the attempted solution of the traditional problems, but the
solution has resulted in the creation of new problems.
MARKETABILITY

UNDER THE

1917 ACT

A brief r~sum6 of marketability under the old Act can be made by
considering proposed sales of real estate by:
An heir or devisee. The purchaser of property from an heir took it
subject to several risks. All debts of the decedent were liens on his real
property for a period of one year from death, and remained liens for a five
56
year 'period if the creditor indexed his claim within the initial year.
5
There was always the possibility of a later will turning up, 7 or of attacks
54. In re North Jersey Title Ins. Co., 120 N.J. Eq. 148, 184 Atl. 420 (1936);
Metcalfe v. Union Trust Co. of N.Y., 181 N.Y. 39, 73 N.E. 498 (1905).
55. The constitutionality of the entire Act is not called into question by the present
discussion. It seems clear that § 105 is severable from the remander of the Act within
the meaning of PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 46, §555 (Purdon, 1950), which provides for
severing the unconstitiutional portions without defeating the entire act.
56. Act of 1917, § 521. Indexing a claim is accomplished by filing an action
against the personal representative of the decedent. Szusta v. Krawiec, 36 Luz. L.
Reg. 183 (Pa. 1943). It should be noticed that under this section the action which was
indexed had to be prosecuted to judgment. But allowance of the claim by the
Orphans' Court or inclusion of it in the Schedule of Distribution was the same as
entry of judgment under this section.
57. Subsequent wills can defeat the title of purchasers from heirs only if probated
within three years of decedent's death. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 1887 (Purdon,

1950).
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on the title by other people claiming to be heirs. This was possible as there
could be no court order, in the absence of litigation, to confirm the distribution of real property. The possibility of later claims by heirs constituted
a cloud on the title for thirty-one years, the period of adverse possession
plus disabilities, 8 unless a will was probated. A purchaser from a devisee
was free of all claims, except the indexed claims of creditors, after two years
from the probate of the will.59
A personal representative by court order.0° This procedure was possible only if it was necessary to sell the realty to satisfy debts of the decedent.
The purchaser under a sale of this nature would get title discharged of all
6
liens except mortgages, the sale having the effect of a judicial sale. '

4 personal representative under a lestamentary power given in the
will.62 Where the will directed the executor to sell the real estate, an
equitable conversion was worked which freed the land from the lien of
debts mentioned above.68 If the will had merely authorized the executor
to sell realty, there was no equitable conversion but the lien of debts was
likewise negated because it was conclusively presumed that sales under
such authority were for the payment of debts. 6aa Any purchaser from a
personal representative under a testamentary power was subject to liens
of record, 64 and possibly to later claims by heirs or devisees. 65
It seems that under the old Act, in the absence of a sale by court order,
or possibly a sale under a testamentary power, the title to land was completely inalienable for one year after the decedent's death due to the lien of
debts, and not totally certain until the expiration of the period of adverse
possession since there was no formal administration of the realty under
the auspices cf the Orphans' Court.
MARKETABILITY UNDER THE

NEW

ACT

One of the prime purposes of the Fiduciaries' Act of 1949 is to make
real estate more readily alienable0 6 To see how successful the legislators
were in effectuating this purpose, an examination of the two methods of
disposing of a decedent's estate will be made.
58. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, §§ 72, 73 (Purdon, 1931). PA. STAT. ANN., tit.
20, § 111 (Purdon, 1950), amending PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 112 (Purdon, 1931)
provided a means for the surviving spouse to get absolute title in the Orphans' Court
after a year from decedent's death.
59. See note 8 supra and text.
60. Act of 1917, § 551.
61. Act of 1917, §574.
62. Act of 1917, §711.
63. Mahoney's Estate, 356 Pa. 358, 52 A.2d 328 (1947); Suppes's Estate, 322

Pa. 385, 185 Atl. 616 (1936).
63a. See Shaffer Estate, 360 Pa. 390, 61 A.2d 872 (1948).

64. See Fisher v. Kurtz, 28 Pa. 47 (1857).
65. Act of 1917, § 711 seems to indicate that an executor with authority to sell
under a will should be treated as an ordinary devisee.
66. See Hunter, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA BAR AssociATiON IN INsTITUTE ON FIDuciARiEs ACT OF 1949, 4. (Hereinafter cited as REPORT.)
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Administration by a Personal Representative. For the first time in
the history of Pennsylvania, realty may be administered by the personal
representative just as personalty. 67 Although title to land still passes to
the decedent's heirs or devisees,68 it is subject to several powers of the
personal representative. Section 501 gives him power to possess all real
estate except where an heir or devisee is in possession at the decedent's
death; Section 541 gives the personal representative power to sell all real
estate not specifically devised, unless he is otherwise prohibited in the will;
Section 732 gives him the power to distribute the land before a formal
accounting.
Court decree confirming distribution. If the personal representative
goes through the formal administration provided for in the Act, the distributees of real estate are assured of absolute title. 9 Briefly, the procedural
steps involved in a formal administration, from the point of view of time
consumption are: (1) an advertisement of letters; (2) minimum waiting
period of six months before a personal representative can file his account; 70
(3) notice of the filing and proposed audit to all interested parties; 71 (4)
audit of the account and court approval of distribution; 72 (5) recordation
73
of the decree awarding the real estate.
Thus under the present Act it is possible for the heir or devisee to be
assured of the status of his title after six or seven months as compared with
the situation under the 1917 Act where an heir was sometimes never sure
until the period of adverse possession had run,74 and a devisee was not
assured of clear title until two years after probate of the will.
If there had been defects in the administration by the personal representative, but the court, nevertheless, decreed the distribution in accordance
with his account, the title of the distributees would still not be adversely
affected, although Section 721 allows five years for any party in interest to
75
contest the decree.
Sale during the administration by personalrepresentative. Among the
broad powers given to the personal representative is the power to sell all
land not specifically devised or otherwise prohibited from sale by the will.7O
This power to sell realty is similar to the power he had under the 1917 Act
67. § 401.
68. § 104.
69. There is no section that so states except § 721 by negative implication. § 731
provides for the distribution of estates not exceeding $1000 without a formal account,
and this distribution is also final.
70. § 701.
71. § 703.
72. The approximate period that the Philadelphia Orphans' Court requires is
two weeks.

73. § 736.
74. See note 58 supra.
75. Judge Hunter suggests, however, that if there is no advertisement of the grant
of letters to a personal representative, a court cannot decree a distribution of real
estate, and if done nonetheless, the title to such realty will be adversely affected. See
note 66 supra.

76. § 541.
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to sell personalty. The personal representative, however, must enter additional security if he desires to receive the proceeds of such a sale, unless he
is exempt from giving bond at all. 7 The purchaser securing title from the
personal representative via Section 541 receives it "discharged from the lien
of legacies, from liability for all debts and obligations of the decedent, from
liabilities incident to the administration ot the decedent's estate and from all
claims of distributees and persons claiming in their right," except liens of
record.78 Although the Act does not so provide, the Philadelphia Orphan's
Court has adopted a local rule requiring personal representatives who have
entered bond to notify all parties in interest of the receipt of the proceeds of
the sale.1 0 In the event that the land has been specifically devised or has
otherwise been prohibited from sale by the will, and the personal representative deems it advisable to sell the land, he may obtain an order of
court directing the sale. 80 Such an order would free the land of all claims,
and also of liens of record except mortgages, since the sale has the effect
8
of a judicial sale. '
The force of these sections is startling when it is seen that real estate
is now marketable by a personal representative immediately upon obtaining letters if the personal representative need not enter security for the sale.
If security is required, theoretically, the receipt of the proceeds of the sale
need only be delayed for a period sufficient to allow the personal repre82
sentative to enter such security and give notice to parties in interest.
Sale during the administration by heirs and devisees. The heirs and
devisees cannot convey good title before confirmation of the personal representative's account by the court, although legal title passes to them under
Section 104 of the Act, because their title is subject to all the powers of the
personal representative including the power to possess and sell. In order
to make their title marketable the heirs and devisees must petition the court
under Section 756 for a decree confirming their title. This can only be
granted six years after the death of the decedent if a personal representative
has been appointed and has not filed his account, or after one year if no
personal representative has been appointed.
Title, after a three month
waiting period, during which time creditors can object to the decree, is
free of all decedent's debts and subsequent wills, but is still subject to liens
77. § 323 exempts corporate personal representative, resident executors and nonresident executors, in certain instances.

78.
79.
80.
81.

§ 547.
Adopted April 4, 1950.
§543.
§ 547. This section states that sales under court order shall be discharged

from "liens of record at the time of the decedent's death." (Emphasis added). By
a literal interpretation of the language in this sction, liens of record obtained after
the decedent's death, but before the sale of realty, are not discharged. This interpretation is reinforced by the language used in § 756, "free of all decedent's debts not then
liens of record," indicating that those drafting the Act intended to distinguish the
situations.
82. See note 79 =zpra. See also § 545.
83. Note that the heirs or devisees can also obtain possession of realty under
§ 735, subject to divestment, before a final decree of distribution.
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of record and possibly to claims from those subsequently alleging to be
heirs. 4
It should be noted that, inasmuch as the personal representative has
no power to sell specifically devised property without court order, and
hasn't the right to possess land occupied by an heir or devisee, the title of a
specific devisee in possession is apparently free from any immediate powers
of the personal representative. But, if the specific devisee in possession
conveys, he passes title that is still subject to sale by an order of the court
under Section 543 on petition by the personal representative. If the personal representative joins in a conveyance with the specific devisee, however, the purchaser would probably take the same title as if he had purchased the land directly from the personal representative under Section

541.85
Distributionof realty before court decree. Section 732 gives the personal representative the right to distribute real estate at his own risk
without filing an account. If he does this after one year has elapsed from
the granting of letters, and no notice of claims has been given him, the
heirs or devisees will take title free and clear of all but recorded liens. If the
personal representative distributes in spite of notice given him within the
year, although the ditributees' title is subject to creditors' claims, a bona
fide purchaser from the distributees would probably take the land free of
such claims."6 However, if the recipient was not the rightful distributee,
both the recipient and any purchaser from him would be subject to the
claims of the rightful distributee.
No administration by a personal representative. Statistics show that
there is only one administration for every four deaths. This is logically
explained in the light of the fact that the size of the majority of estates is
less than $5,000.00-28.2% less than $1,000.00-thus not warranting the
87
expense of a formal administration.
Sale by an heir or devisee within one year of decedent's death. How
does the Act affect marketability where there is no personal representative
appointed? Where no letters have been granted to a personal representa84. § 756 probably was intended to free the land of all but recorded liens, but the
language used, "free of all decedent's debts not then liens of record, and regardless
of the provisions of any testamentary writing of the decedent thereafter probated," may
lead to the conclusion then that the land is subject to attack from heirs. This is to
be compared with the language used in the Intestate Act of 1947. PA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 20, § 1.11 (Purdon, 1950) and the Intestate Act of 1917, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20,
§ 112 (Purdon, 1930) which clearly eliminates claims of the heirs and devisees.
85. See Schmidt, REPORT, op. cit. supra note 66, at 8; LADNER, REAL ESTATE CoNIVEYANCING 139 (Supp. 1951).
86. See Schmidt, REPORT, op. cit. supra note 66, at 9. This assumes that the
traditional creditor's lien no longer exists under the Act. The Act does not specifically
abolish the lien, but provides other remedies in all other cases where the lien formerly
extended. It is probably safe to assume that where no remedy is provided, none was
intended, since that is the view of the Commissioners at least with regard to § 732.
Sections 545, 615, etc., talk about "holders of a lien," but it is probable that this refers
to liens of record.
87. See Schmidt, id. at 1.
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tive the same factual situation is presented under the Act of 1949 as where
there was a formal administration under the Act of 1917, in the sense that
the decedent's real estate is not administered by a personal representative
in either case. The consequences in terms of marketability is likewise identical in that the property, under either Act, is not freely alienable until the
expiration oi one year from death, but the reasons for this period of inalienability are different under the old and new Acts. Under the old Act
the land was inalienable because all debts of the decedent were liens on his
real estate for one year after death; 88 under the new Act, according to Section 615, debts are not liens on the property, but a creditor can defeat any
conveyance by an heir or devisee within one year of decedent's death by
having a personal representative appointed.8 9
Sale by heir or devisee after one year from decedent's death. Land
was more readily alienable after one year under the old Act than under the
new Act where no personal representative has been appointed because the
failure of a creditor to index his lien within the one year provided by the
old Act was absolutely fatal to his claim against the real property; 90
whereas, under the present Act he can retain a claim against all property
not yet sold if he has a personal representative appointed after one year. 9 '
Even if the land is sold after one year and before a personal representative
is appointed, the creditor, whose claim is not barred by the statute of limitations, could apparently get another shot at the property if unknown heirs
or devisees should later appear. This is so because Section 615 bars only
claims against purchasers who acquired their interests from "those entitled
," 92
to the property by will or by intestacy...
A purchaser from an heir or devisee has the further problem under the
present Act of ascertaining whether or not a personal representative has
been appointed. Although Section 301 of the 1949 Act provides that letters
testamentary or of administration shall be granted only in the county where
the decedent had his last principal residence, it might be very difficult for
a purchaser to determine where that "residence" is, in order to see whether
letters have been taken out there.93
It should be noted that Section 615 of the 1949 Act when applicable
only frees the land from the claims of creditors; it does not purport to cut
off the rights of those who might subsequently claim to be heirs or devisees
and presumably such claimants have the same rights now where there is no
formal administration as they did before when real estate was never
administered.
Unquestionably, where a personal representative is appointed under
the Act of 1949, title to real estate which he administers is more readily
88. Act of 1917, §521.
89. § 305(b) (4) permits a creditor to administer the estate; he can take out
90. Act of 1917, § 521. Graham's Estate, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A.2d 125 (1943).
letters 7 days after the decedent's death (§305(c)).
91. § 615(1).
92. Emphasis added.
93. See Schmidt, REPORT, op. cit. mtpra note 66, at 17.
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marketable, by far, than was real estate under the Act of 1917. Where no
letters are granted, however, realty is no more marketable under the
present Act than it was before; in fact it is probably less marketable. It is
interesting to note that the changes in marketability that have been wrought
by the Act of 1949 have not been reflected in the rates charged by title
insurance companies in Philadelphia County.
Creditors' Rights
From an early date in Pennsylvania a decedent's creditors have had a
lien on his real estate for the payment of debts. 4 Originally this lien existed
for an indefinite period, but through the years the time for which the lien
would extend without the creditors taking steps to preserve it has been
progressively shortened. 95
Under the Fiduciaries Act of 1917 the creditor's lien on a decedent's
real estate was lost one year from the decedent's death unless during
that period the creditor brought suit against the personal representative and
indexed the suit in the judgment index in the county in which the action
was brought as well as in the county in which the land was situated.9 6
If this was not done and the land was later sold in payment of debts, the
creditor had no right to share in the proceeds of the real estate nor could
he go against the land itself. In such a situation all creditors would first
share pro rata in the personalty and then the deficiencies of those who had
preserved their liens would be made up out of the realty.97 In this way the
diligent creditor was given an advantage over the unwary or uninformed
creditor. But all too often a creditor's rights in the land were cut off at the
expiration of a year merely because of the procedure which it was necessary
for him to follow in order to preserve his lien.98
To afford the creditor protection, and also to give the decedent's real
estate a more marketable title, the Fiduciaries Act of 1949 abolished the old
lien of debts and provided that the administration of real estate should be
similar to that of personalty.9 9 No longer is the creditor's interest in
decedent's realty lost forever if he fails to follow the procedure of bringing
suit and indexing his claim within the year. No time limit is now set after
which the creditor automatically without more loses the right to be satisfied
out of decedent's realty. As long as the creditor's claim has not been barred
by the statute of limitations he may give written notice to the personal
representative, assuming that one has been appointed, and this will have
the effect of tolling the statute of limitations. 10
This will entitle the
94. REmICK, PENNSYLVANIA
see also note 9 supra.

ORPHANS'

COURT PRACTICE

§ 95 (3rd ed., 1938);

95. Ibid.
96. Act of 1917, § 521.
97. Mason's Appeal, 89 Pa. 402 (1879).
98. Eckert, The Pemsylvania Fiduciaries Act of 1949, 11 PITT. L. REv. 194.
196 (1950).
99. Id. at 195, 196; LADNER, REAL ESTATE CONVEYANCING 115 (Supp. 1951).
100. § 614(a).
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creditor to written notice of the filing of the account and its call for audit
or confirmation. 1' 1 If the property has not been previously distributed the
creditor is entitled to be satisfied out of both realty and personalty notwithstanding the fact that he did not give notice within a year of decedent's
02
death.
In these respects the position of the creditor has been strengthened, but
in other respects it has been weakened. Because of the possibility of a
prior distribution before he gives notice of his claim it is now incumbent on
the creditor to act more swiftly. For he is no longer guaranteed a lien
on the realty for a period extending a year from decedent's death. An
account may be filed six months after the grant of letters. 1 3 If the creditor
fails to present his claim at the audit or confirmation of that account he is
not entitled to share in any of the realty or personalty distributed pursuant
thereto. 104 Thus if the account is filed in the minimum time and the audit
follows soon thereafter, the creditor may lose his right in the real estate
distributed at that time although a year has not passed since decedent's
death. And even if the mechanics of administration proceed at a slower
pace it is still necessary for the creditor to act quickly in order to preserve
his interest in the realty. If he fails to give notice of his claim to the personal representative within a year of the grant of letters, at the expiration
of that period the personal representative may distribute the decedent's
property both real and personal, and neither the distributee nor the personal
representative will be liable to the creditor for the property so distributed. 0 5
All of the creditor's interest in the real estate will then be lost.
A creditor may also lose his right to satisfaction out of the realty even
though no personal representative has been appointed. At the end of a
year from the decedent's death the heir or devisee or anyone claiming an
interest through them may petition the Orphans' Court to establish title
in them. 108 The court may enter a decree nisi to that effect, and if no
exception is taken witlin three months it will become absolute. 10 7 The
creditor will then have no more rights to that land.
The creditor may lose his rights to the land even though there is no
court action, for if no letters have been granted within a year the bona fide
grantee of an heir or devisee will take title free of all claims which were
not liens or charges on the real estate at the decedent's death. But this is
no more than happened automatically at the end of a year under the 1917
Act, whether or not a personal representative was appointed, if the creditor
had taken no action. In such a case under the 1949 Act the position of the
creditor has been improved in that he may still recover from the heir or
devisee the value of the property through an action brought by a subse101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

§ 703.
See § 616.
§701.
§ 616.
§ 732; Comment to § 732.
§ 756.
Ibid.

1180

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

quently appointed personal representative,10 8 provided, of course, that such
a person is not judgment-proof.
Assuming that the creditor has been diligent and taken all the necessary steps to protect his interest in the land before an accounting or call
for audit, how does his protection under the Fiduciaries Act of 1949 compare with that afforded by the Fiduciaries Act of 1917? Under the old
Act if the creditor had brought suit and properly indexed his claim a lien
on the land existed for five years which could only be discharged by payment of the debt or by a sale undertaken to satisfy debts which were liens
on the land. 10 9 Such sale was conducted under the direction of the court
and had the effect of a judicial sale. 110 The personal representative making the sale was required to post bond."' Under the Fiduciaries Act of
1949, however, the personal representative may sell decedent's real estate
without making any petition to the court unless the land was specifically
devised or the power was denied him in the will." 2 In such a sale the
title of the purchaser is free of all obligations to creditors except those
which were liens of record at the decedent's death."18 It is true that, in
order to receive the proceeds of such a sale, the personal representative
must have given additional security if he was originally required to post
bond, unless excused by the court, 1 4 but there are many instances, aside
from exceptions granted by the court, where a bond is not required." 5
The result is that the creditor may no longer be secured by an interest in
realty, a bond, or a sale conducted under the direction of the court, but
will be left with a mere right to share in liquid assets which may easily
be wrongfully disposed of by an unscrupulous personal representative.
Moreover, the danger that an improvident sale may be entered into which
would harm the creditor's interest in the estate by reducing the total value
of the assets available to him is increased. Some protection is afforded
against this danger by Section 545, which allows a party in interest to
petition the court to restrain a sale of realty if it does not appear to be in
the best interests of the estate, but just as in the 1917 Act this remedy is
not available if the power of sale was given in the will,116 and the right is of
no avail to a creditor who has no notice of the sale, which may well be
17
the case if the sale takes place early in the administration of the estate."
Of course, with an honest and capable personal representative, this power
of sale would not work to the detriment of the creditor and might well
be to his advantage, as the personal representative could act quickly in
making beneficial sales.
108. § 615.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Act of 1917, §§ 521, 574.
Act of 1917, § 574.
Act of 1917, § 557.
§541.
§547.

114. § 541.

115. § 323.

116. § 545.

117. LADNER, op. cit. mipra note 99, at 136.
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There are dispositions which may be made of realty other than a
sale by a personal representative. First of all, when no personal representative has been appointed the heir or devisee may dispose of the
property without a conveyance from the personal representative. In such
a case it seems clear that the land remains subject to the claims of the
creditor even in the hands of a bona fide purchaser, for though title to
the land passes to the heir or devisee it is subject to the powers of the
personal representative so that the purchaser has not actually acquired a
complete title." 8 But if a personal representative having notice of the
creditor's claim voluntarily distributes the land, may the creditor then go
against the land in the hands of a bona fide purchaser from the distributee? Under the old Act if the creditor had preserved his lien, the
land remained subject to the creditor's claim even in the hands of a bona
fide purchaser. Under Section 732 of the 1949 Act, however, a creditor
will lose all right in the land if the personal representative voluntarily distributes to an heir or devisee who subsequently disposes of the land to a
bona fide purchaser, since there is no longer a lien of debts on the land
and, unlike the conveyance by an heir or devisee without a distribution
by the personal representative, it can no longer be said that the personal
representative has any powers over lands conveyed to distributees. 119
In such a case the creditor is left only with a cause of action against the
personal representative, who may or may not have posted bond, and against
20

the distributee.1

Conclusion

The rules governing the administration of decedents' realty outlined
above reveal both the extent and the limitations of the assimilation of
realty and personalty under the 1949 Act. The inclusion at many points
of special rules for real property, such as Sections 541, 545, and 615,
demonstrates that the assimilation is not complete. In the main, the
changes worked by the Act in this area seem to favor the readier and
more certain transfer of property to the recipients, at the expense of
opportunities of creditors to assert their rights against the land. Modern
business conditions underline the need for greater marketability of real
property, and the growth in the alienability of land has brought with it
the necessity that the power to alienate may be freely and speedily exercised.
The gravitation of the business of handling decedents' estates to trust companies emphasizes the growing interrelation of business methods and needs
in general with the business of dealing with real property.
The Power to Restrain Sales of Realty
As noted above, one of the major changes made by the new Act is
the expanded powers of sale of realty given a personal representative.
118. § 615 (implication).
119. Schmidt, REPORT, op. cit. sttpra note 66, at 9.
and text.
120. Ibid., § 732.

See notes 9 and 86 supra
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Whereas under the 1917 Act he could sell realty only under a testamentary
direction, or under a court order where funds were needed to pay the
decedent's debts,: 2 1 Section 541 of the 1949 Act empowers him to sell any
real property not specifically devised where there is no specific prohibition
in the will. This power is limited by Section 545, under which the court
may restrain such sales in its discretion. It is to be noted at the outset that
the power to restrain applies only to such sales as the personal representative may make under Section 541; it does not apply to sales which the
will authorizes the personal representative to make.122 In contrast to the
1917 Act, a fiduciary with a testamentary power to sell can now sell for
purposes of easing distribution and administration, irrespective of the
wishes of the heirs.12 3 Their only legal sanction to prevent abuse of this
power is the possibility of surcharge for negligence or fraud.124 But the
additional remedy of restraint of sale is available with respect to other
sales of realty, and the primary problem raised thereby is the extent of the
restraining power in view of the curious history of the power in Pennsylvania law.
The leading case of Orr's Estate,2 5 decided in 1925, laid down the
rule that a fiduciary must repudiate a contract of sale upon receipt of a
higher offer from a third party. Its full ramifications, as seen in later cases,
made any contract of sale prima facie improvident where a subsequent
substantially higher offer was received. 2 6 The court promulgated the doctrine in order to protect decedents' estates from improvident sales of assets,
and to secure more funds"for the estate. Obviously violative of the concept
of the sanctity of contracts, the rule had the effect of making fiduciaries'
contracts risky and uncertain. Purchasers incurred the risk of having what
they thought was a good and binding contract invalidated by a third party's
tender of a higher offer. If the purchaser knew that he was dealing with a
fiduciary, he had no cause of action against the fiduciary personally, 2 7 or
against the estate 128 for damages for his loss of bargain. The estate itself

121. Act of 1917, § 552; 1 REMICK, PENNSYLVANIA ORPHANS' COURT PRACTICE
160 (1938).
122. Cf. §§ 541, 544; see also § 545.
123. It was indicated by Commissioner Schmidt that it is still desirable for
testators to give executors an express power to sell real estate, notwithstanding the
powers given by § 541 to sell for ". . . a testamentary power to sell cannot be
restrained under § 545." REPORT, op. cit. supra note 66, at 8 (1950).
124. When questioned about unnecessary sale of real estate by fiduciaries to
swell commissions, Commissioner Schmidt replied, "Under the old law, a representative could sell all of the stock in a corporation, although the heir or devisee might
desire to take in kind in distribution. As I say, we have to face these problems
in a very practical way." Id. at 18. But in certain areas, i.e., sales under § 541, the
power of restraint in § 545 might be useful in preventing such abuse.
125. 283 Pa. 476, 129 Atl. 565 (1925).
126. Kane v. Girard Trust Co., 351 Pa. 191, 40 A.2d 466 (1945) ; Good v. Capital
Bank & Trust Co., 337 Pa. 353, 11 A.2d 489 (1940); McCullogh's Estate, 292 Pa.
177, 140 Ati. 865 (1928) ; Hoerner v. Union Trust Co., 39 D. & C. 680 (Pa. 1940);
but c.f. Peter's Estate, 39 D. & C. 596 (Pa. 1940).
127. Kargiatly v. Provident Trust Co., 338 Pa. 358 12 A.2d 11 (1940).
128. Powers' Estate, 153 Pa. Super. 161, 33 A.2d 501 (1943).
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suffered too, because this doctrine discouraged purchasers from bidding
on property being sold by a fiduciary, thus retarding liquidation of the
estate and raising costs of administration. The temporary benefit from
taking higher bids was thus outweighed by resulting decreases in the total
amount received by the estate when a consummated sale took place . 29
Further, ordinary concepts of equitable conversion on execution of contracts of sale, which put the risk of loss before settlement on purchasers,
did not apply to sales made by fiduciaries, because of the rule in Orr's
Estate.'30 Thus, to protect the estate fully, the fiduciary had the burden
of making proper insurance arrangements. A third group injured by the
application of the rule were the real estate brokers, who were not entitled to
any commission for their services where they knew they were dealing with
a fiduciary if, prior to settlement, the contract was repudiated because of
the receipt of a higher offer.' 3 '
Taking cognizance of dissatisfaction with the settled rule, 32 the legislature, in 1945, enacted remedial legislation.'33 The Act forbade a fiduciary
from repudiating his contract on the grounds of inadequacy of consideration,
or receipt of an offer to deal on other terms. Furthermore, a court could
not refuse to grant specific performance for the same reasons. However,
the right of the court to set aside a contract for fraud, accident or mistake,
or to surcharge a fiduciary for negligence or bad faith was not interfered
with. 34 This Act was effective in abrogating the rule in Orr's Estate
and in reinstating the efficacy of executory contracts of sale made with
fiduciaries.
In light of the foregoing, a serious question arises as to whether the
new Act resuscitates the rule in Orr's Estate, with regard to sales made
by personal representatives other than under a testamentary power, or
whether the courts will utilize the broad language of Section 545 to do
so themselves. It is the contention of some experienced attorneys in
3 5
the field, that Section 545 is not a return to the quagmire of Orr's Estate,1
even though there is no hint in the language of that section as to where a
line should be drawn. Under certain types of situations the court should,
and probably would, exercise its restraining power: where the property
involved has sentimental value, and the heirs desire it to remain in the
family, an unnecessary sale would be restrained; where a legatee desires
to take his gift in the form of realty rather than money, an unnecessary
129. It re Central Trust & Savings Co., 41 D. & C. 304, 307 (Pa. 1941).
130. Brigham, Fiduciary Agreements of Sale, 15 PA. B.A.Q. 221, 226 (1944).
131. Clark v. Provident Trust Co., 329 Pa. 421, 198 At. 36 (1938).
132. "We also suggest that the attention of the Legislature might well be called
to the question of the advisability of changing by statute the effect of the decision in
Orr's Estate and the cases which have followed it." Dissenting justices in Kane v.
Girard Trust Co., supra note 126.
133. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, §§ 818, 819 (Purdon, 1950).
134. Ibid.
135. ". . . there is no fear of the ghost of Orr's Appeal returning." Report,
op. cit. supra note 66, at 8.
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Further, if a bona fide dispute arises
sale would also be restrained. 13
between an heir and the personal representative as to the wisdom of retaining real estate for investment purposes, and a sufficiently strong case
is made out of a potential rise in its value as an investment, the sale might
be restrained. Finally, there might arise a situation where an heir feels
that a sale would be improvident, and can prove a reasonably wide divergence between the market value at the time of the contract, and the
proposed contract price. This, too, might call for the application of
Section 545. Restraining these sales as a matter of public policy would
fall short of the rule in Orrs Estate, for even in the last situation mentioned above there is a marked distinction between requiring a fiduciary
to sell at the then-existing market value and abrogating a contract of
sale when the market rises and a higher offer is made.
Whatever the desirability of restricting the power to restrain sales,
the question remains what the Orphans' Courts will do. That Or-/s Estate
is not revived is well supported not only by policy considerations but by
the fact that the Act of 1945 is still on the books. 13 7 On the other hand,
the repealer section of the 1949 Act states that "all other acts and parts
of acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed." 138 Whether it will
be held that the restrictions imposed by the 1945 Act are inconsistent
with the broad powers granted by the 1949 Act will depend on whether
the Orphans' Courts have been sufficiently influenced by the arguments
of the critics of Orr's Estate to impose a restriction upon themselves, or
whether they will continue to handle fiduciary sales under the broad
equitable powers traditionally utilized. It is to be noted that the 1949
Act has left to the discretion of the separate Orphans' Courts the procedures to be worked out in the exercise of the powers of restraint. The
Philadelphia courts have adopted a rule requiring a fiduciary under bond
to furnish the court, in a petition to receive the proceeds of a sale, complete information regarding the terms and conditions of the sale, the names
of all interested parties, and proof that notice of the sale was given to
such persons. The court then appoints its own appraiser to evaluate the
property, and this appraisal is used by the court as an aid in determining
whether to approve or disapprove the sale.' 39 This discretion as to procedures may be carried to the point of taking Section 545 at its face
value, as a reiteration of the equitable principles inherent in Orphans'
Courts' activity. In Or/s Estate the court based its decision entirely upon
the ground that the acts of executors are subject to the control of the
Orphans' Court, which has full power to protect the estate from an
-improvident contract.' 4 0 If this high statement is held to be the sense of
136. See note 124 supra. § 734 empowers the court to grant distribution in kind.
It is arguable that this section would be meaningless unless the court could restrain
the disposition of realty prior to distribution.
137. The new 1950 edition of Purdon includes the Act in §§ 818, 819.

138. § 1401 (b).

139. LADNER, REAL EsTATE CONVEYANCING 134-135 (Supp. 1951).
140. See Brigham, supra, note 130 at 222
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Section 545, that section may well be the initial step in the resurrection
of Orr's Estate.
The only case to date that has dealt with Section 545 stated in dictum
that each case will depend upon its particular facts. 141 No mention was
made of any restriction on the power to restrain; indeed the court took
special note of the broad discretion granted by Section 545. It is hoped
that an interpretation of the power to restrain, when the issue arises, will
be made not solely with regard to the language of the Act, but with an
eye to the proper meaning of the Act in the light of the difficulties attendant on the rule in Orr's Estate, and the considered opinions of
the commissioners.
Order of Abatement
Section 751(a) of the Fiduciaries Act of 1949 provides that where
there is a deficiency of assets, 142 after payment of creditors, to satisfy the
claims of all distributees, and the testator has not dictated in his will a
different scheme of abatement, gifts shall be preferred without distinction
between real and personal estate in accordance with the following schedule:
(1) Specific gifts to, or in trust for, the surviving spouse.
(2) Specific gifts to, or in trust for, the decedent's issue.
(3) All other specific gifts, whether outright or in trust.
(4) General legacies of cash, stocks, or bonds.
(5) All other general gifts. (No indication is given in the Act
or the comments as to the exact meaning of the phrase.)
(6) Residual gifts.
(7) Intestate property.
In so providing, the Act deals with the three primary difficulties historically
associated with abatement. These are (a) the general order of abatement
among the different classes of gifts; (b) preferential treatment of various
categories of takers within any one class; and (c) effect upon abatement
of the distinction traditionally made between gifts of personalty and gifts
141. See Diamandas Estate, 73 D. & C. 334, 337 (Pa. 1950).
142. The Pennsylvania common law apparently drew no distinction between a
deficency caused by debts exceeding the testator's anticipation, and one caused by the
widow's electing to take against the will. Lonergan's Estate, 303 Pa. 142, 154 Atl.
387 (1931); Gallagher's Appeal, 87 Pa. 200 (1878); Gallagher's Estate, 76 Pa. 296
(1874) ; contra: Taylor's Estate, 5 Phila. 218 (1863). On the other hand, New
York, when the latter situation is presented, abates all legacies equally, the theory
probably being that the testator did not contemplate the widow's electing to take
against the will, and hence had no intention regarding abatement. In re Byrnes
Estate, 149 Misc. 449, 267 N.Y. Supp. 627 (1933). There seems to be no Pennsylvania cases concerning the order of abatement when the deficiency is caused by the
birth of a pretermitted child, but the general rule in other jurisdictions is that all
legacies abate equally. ALEXANDM, COMMENTARIES ON WiLLs § 706 (1918). However, the normal rules of abatement will be suspended even in Pennsylvania when the
deficiency is caused by the waste of the executor, and all legacies abate equally.
Strohm's Appeal, 23 Pa. 351 (1854).
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of land. In determining these problems, the Act has, in general outline,
followed the rules of prior Pennsylvania law: but in certain specific details,
it has departed from precedent.
The General Order of Abatement Among Classes of Gifts. In providing that intestate property and then residual, general, and specific gifts
are abated in that order, the Act follows the rules of the common law
One exception to
based upon the presumed intention of the testator. 14
Act, which
5
of
the
present
clauses
4
and
appears
in
pattern
the traditional
make a distinction between general gifts of money or money's worth in
stocks or bonds, and general gifts of other property. Such a distinction
was unknown in early times; and its origin, for which no valid reason or
explanation has ever been advanced, is to be found in the Wills Act of
1917. It was there provided that pecuniary legacies should be payable out
of real estate not specifically devised.' 44 The effect of this section was to
place general pecuniary legacies in a status just below specific gifts and
above all other non-specific bequests and devises, while non-pecuniary bequests were left in their traditional position. Wise or not, the distinction
between general gifts of money and other property is now a confirmed
idiosyncrasy of Pennsylvania law.
The Order of Preference Within Classes of Gifts. At common law,
certain donees were preferred within classes, although their preference
could not extend to advancing them at the expense of gifts in a higher
class.14 5 Such preferred treatment was accorded creditors left gifts in lieu
of their debts,' 46 widows, 14 7 and minor children of the testator if the gift
The rationale for such preferences was drawn
was for maintenance. 14
from two considerations. The first, especially applicable to the child's
preference, 149 was the presumed intent of the testator. The second was
that creditors and widows could enforce claims against the estate and receive
payment unabated in any event. 6 0
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS at 708 (1937).
144. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 241 (Purdon, 1930).
145. Boehrig's Estate, 17 Pa. Dist. 46 (1907) (demonstrative legacy to the testator's brother was preferred to a pecuniary legacy to the testator's daughter). The
conclusion is also borne out by the language in Appeal of the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, 97 Pa. 187, 199-200 (1881): "But, if there be any valuable
consideration for the testamentary gift, or the relinquishment of any right or interest,
such legacy will be entitled to preference . . . over other geiwral legacies which are
mere bounties." Emphasis added. This was also said in effect in Henry's Estate,
20 Pa. CC. 415, 418 (1898).
146. Harper's Appeal, 111 Pa. 243, 2 Atl. 861 (1884); Appeal of the Trustees
of the University of Pennsylvania, supra; Wilson's Estate, 15 Phila. 528 (1882);
ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 143, at 709-710; ALEXANDER, op. Cit. Vupra note 142,
at 697.
147. Reed v. Reed, 9 Watts 263 (Pa. 1840); McDaniel's Estate, 20 Phila. 86
(1890).
148. Boehrig's Estate, supra note 145; Bixenstein's Estate, 6 Pa. Dist. 19 (1896)
Barry's Estate, 13 Phila. 310 (1880) ; Reed v. Reed, supra.
149. Reed v. Reed, supra; Barry's Estate, mtpra; Bixenstein's Estate, supra;
Comment, 36 Micn. L. REv. 297, 305-306 (1937).
150. Comment, supra note 149 at 298-302.

143. ATKINSON,
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This common law system of preferences within classes has been adopted
to an indeterminable extent by the present Act. Clauses 1 and 2 provide
preferential treatment for specific gifts to spouses and children. The creditor preference, however, is nowhere mentioned. This suggests that the
legislature intended to abolish the creditor's preference entirely. However,
since no such intent is specifically expressed, it is possible that the courts
will read a preference for creditors into the general framework of clauses
3, 4, and 5. This would help to cut down on the litigation of unliquidated
claims which the creditor preference primarily served to prevent; for one
effect of a literal reading of the Act is that creditors, when abatement
threatens, may well sue the estate.
Clauses 1, 2 and 3 effect additional minor changes. No cases have
been found in which the question of a widower's preference has been
raised, but clause 1 specifically provides for it by the use of the word
"spouse." Clauses 1 and 2 place the claim of the surviving spouse ahead
of the issue's, whereas the Pennsylvania common law apparently placed
them on a parity. 5 ' Lastly, no longer must the dual common law requirements of minority and maintenance be fulfilled before a child's preference
1 52
is granted.
One question, not expressly settled by the Act, is the extent of the
surviving spouse's preference. Is the spouse's specific legacy in excess of
the statutory share preferred to the extent of such excess? The answer
depends upon the basic rationale ascribed to the preference. If the theory
is the spouse's right to take unabated against the will, any excess should
abate proportionately with all other gifts; if the basis is the presumed
intent of the testator, the preference should cover the entire gift. Historically, it was created to "bribe" the widow from exercising her indefeasible right to dower, which could disrupt the scheme of every devise
since the widow was entitled to her interest in the land itself.r'3 Analogizing
to the position of the creditor, the courts called the widow a "purchaser."
The preference thus justified, there was no need to seek a more valid
justification since wlhat theory was employed mattered only if the gift exceeded the statutory share, and the issue was not raised until 1920. The
court in Greave's Estate,15 4 led astray by the "purchaser" talk in the long
line of cases, ignored the possibility of there having always co-existed the
more vital underlying basis of simply fulfilling the testator's presumed
intent. This was openly recognized as the rationale for the child's preference, but unarticulated with reference to the spouse's because such an151. Sussman's Estate, 62 Mont. Co. L.R. 297 (1946) (both wife and daughter
had specific legacies).
152. See note 148 mspra. It seems perfectly clear upon a literal reading of the
Act that these requirements have been eliminated, and yet to quote from the Commissionwr's Comment, "Clauses (1) and (2) are intended to clarify the confusion
which arises where a legacy is given to a widow or for inaintenawe of a child"
(italics supplied). Do the Commissioners infer that there still remains this condition ?
153. ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 143, at 710.
154. 29 PA. DIST. 577 (1920).
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nouncement was never necessary. In that case, the court held any excess
of the statutory share abated. This single lower court decision cannot be
accepted as the settled Pennsylvania law, and probably the legislative intent
behind the Act was to follow the enlightened majority view of other jurisdictions which is to prefer the entire gift,' 55 Greave's Estate notwithstanding.
This conclusion is fortified by an analysis of the Act. That the creditor's preference is unmentioned, while the preferment for children is extended, suggests that the legislature was considering the presumed intention of the testator; for the former is founded exclusively upon the theory
of purchase, and the latter is based exclusively upon the theory of the
testator's intent. Moreover, the Act expressly states that the preference
of the spouse is supreme. Unless the entire gift of the spouse is preferred,
the order prescribed by the Act will be partially repudiated.
Curiously, and unfortunately, the Act limits all preferences to takers
of specific property. No preference whatsoever is granted any takers of
general legacies. It might be argued that every reason for preferring particular takers of specific property applies with equal force to takers of
general property. It is possible that the courts will read into clauses 4 and 5
the same scheme of preferences set up specifically in clauses 1, 2, and 3.
Such action would seem to be legitimate since the Commissioner's Comment
to Section 751 states that the sections are but declaratory of the existing
case law.
The Effect Upon Abatement of the Distinction Between Personalty
and Land. At the early English common law, gifts of personalty, whether
specific, general, or residual abated before gifts of real estate or descended
land.' 56 This preference, based upon the distinctive position of landed
estate, has been completely abolished by the present Act. According to the
Commissioners' Comment upon Section 751, this institution of parity
between the two classes of estate is the most significant change made by the
Act. For most practical purposes, however, the Pennsylvania law had
already long ignored the distinction.
From the earliest times, specific devises, bequests, and legacies have
abated pro-rata in Pennsylvania. 15 7 That the British distinction was not
enforced here is explained by the fact that since 1700 land has been subject
to simple contract debts in this Commonwealth.15 8 Thus, the repudiation
of the distinction between bequests and devises made in clauses 1, 2, and 3
is far from surprising, for it amounts to a mere reiteration of traditional
Pennsylvania law.
155. Comment, supra note 149, at 300-302.
156. ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 143, at § 251.
157. Comm. v. Sheely, 13 S. & R. 348 (Pa. 1825); Appeal of Armstrong, 63
Pa. 312 (1869).
158. Act of Nov. 27, 1700, 2 PA. STAT. L. 31-34 (Mitchell & Flanders, 1896).
This Act was repealed by the Queen in Council, Feb. 7, 1705-6, but its provisions
were included in other legislation. For a discussion, see Graff v. Smith's Admr's, 1
Dall. 481 (Pa. 1789).
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In the case of general gifts, however, the story is somewhat different.
That general devises were also subject to debts was judicially ignored.
Instead, personalty was deemed to be the primary fund for the payment of
debts and it was held throughout the course of the 19th century that general
legacies and bequests would abate before general or residual devises or
descended lands.' 59 This discrimination was somewhat ameliorated by
cases holding that where land and personalty had been "blended" in the
residual clause, 60 or elsewhere,' 0 ' land would abate pro-rata with gifts of
personalty of the same class and give way before personal gifts of a higher
category. This illogical and confused state of the law was largely remedied
by the Wills Act of 1917. Its provision that pecuniary bequests should be
payable out of land not specifically devised 162 meant that general pecuniary
bequests were to be preferred above general devises. However, the status
of other general bequests remained unchanged. Until the present Act was
passed, it was true that general bequests and gifts of personalty in residual
clauses would give way before general or residual devises or descended
lands, "blending" always excepted. With the passage of this Act, these
last vestiges of the realty preference have been swept away. This abolition
of the realty preference, when coupled with the preference given to pecuniary legacies under clause 4, leads to an unprecedented result. Perhaps for
the first time in the history of Anglo-American law, there is a jurisdiction
in which non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary gifts of personalty are in
practice preferred over gifts of land. The commissioners, instead of eliminating the distinction as they claim, have in fact partly reversed it.
Demonstrative Legacies. Section 751(b) of the Act provides that
"property out of which a demonstrative legacy is primarily to be paid shall
be deemed tc be specifically devised or bequeathed to the extent of such
demonstrative legacy." The natural implication of this language is that
general property, out of which a deficiency in the fund is to be made up, is
not to be deemed specifically, devised or bequeathed, a mere restatement of
the common law. 0 3 This means that where T bequeaths "$10,000, the sum
I have on deposit at the First National Bank" to X, and there is but $8,000
on deposit in that bank at the time of death, the $8,000 in the bank will
abate with the specific provisions while the $2,000 which will be taken
from the general estate to complete the legacy will abate with the general
159. Crone's Appeal, 103 Pa. 571 (1883); Risk's Appeal, 110 Pa. 171, 1 Atl.
85 (1885) ; Espy's Estate, 207 Pa. 459, 56 Atl. 1005 (1904).
160. Nicholas v. Postlethwaite, 2 Dall. 131 (Pa. 1791); Gallagher's Appeal, 48
Pa. 121 (1864).
161. Fetter's Estate, 152 Pa. Super. 10, 30 A2d 647 (1943).
162. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, §241 (Purdon, 1930). The Wills Act of 1947 repeats the same provision save that it excepts pecuniary legacies of less than $100.
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 180(14), (13) (Purdon, 1950). This exception of legacies
of less than $100 may be repealed, in effect, by clause 4 of the present Act, which
includes pecuniary legacies of less than $100.
163. The common law view was that demonstrative legacies abated with specific
gifts to the extent of the fund designated. ATKINSON, Op. Cit. smpra note 143, at 711;
1 ROPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LEGACIES, 363 (4th ed., White, 1848).
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gifts. This distinction has never been recognized in terms in Pennsylvania,
and there are dicta indicating that demonstrative legacies will abate with
specific legacies regardless of whether the fund designated is sufficient to
cover them.1 4 The present Act corrects this possible aberration in Pennsylvania law.
Foreign Fiduciaries
According to common law doctrine, the power of a personal representative, or other court appointed fiduciary, was confined to the jurisdiction of the court which appointed him.'0 5 This rule has been applied as
between fiduciaries appointed in different states of the United States. 16 6
As a result, whenever a decedent possessed property situated in more than
one state it became necessary to raise ancillary administration in the other
states in addition to the domiciliary administration. Debtors of the decedent who voluntarily paid a foreign personal representative subjected themselves to a possibility of double payment if an ancillary administration was
later created.'0 7 Recognition of the fact that in many cases the added expenses and delay of ancillary administration served no useful purpose has
led to a relaxation of the strict common law rule through the doctrine of
comity and by statute.' 68
One of the first states to grant extensive powers to foreign fiduciaries
was Pennsylvania which in the Act of 1705 gave a foreign fiduciary all the
rights and powers accorded to local fiduciaries. 1 9 This liberal approach
was abruptly reversed in 1830 when Chief Justice Gibson completely
ignored the 1705 Act and reiterated the common law view.' 70 His views
were incorporated into the 1832 Act,1 7 ' which terminated all the powers
of a foreign fiduciary unless ancillary administration was raised. Except
for some minor amendments 172 foreign fiduciaries remained powerless in
Pennsylvania until the Fiduciaries Act of 1917. The ostensible approach
of the 1917 Act was to limit strictly the activities of foreign fiduciaries, but
164. See: Wilson's Estate, 260 Pa. 407, 410, 130 Atl. 880, 881 (1918) ; Walls
v. Stewart, 16 Pa. 275, 281 (1851).
165. Tourton v. Flower, 3 P. Wins. 369, 24 Eng. Rep. 1105 (1735) ; Stacy v.
Thrasher, 6 How. 44 (U. S. 1848).
166. Johnson v. Powers, 139 U.S. 156 (1891) ; Robinson v. First National Bank,
45 F.2d 613 (1930).
167. These problems are discussed in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF COMmIssIoNERs ON UNIFORm STATE LAWs AN) PROCEEDINGS 320 (1944), in a
preface to a proposed Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act at page
325. This proposed Act has not been enacted in any state, although several provisions of Article XI of the '49 Act of Pennsylvania are derived from this proposal.
168. Reynolds v. McMullen, 55 Mich. 568, 22 N.W. 41 (1885); Kirkbride v.
Van Note, 275 N.Y. 244, 9 N.E.2d 852 (1937); see comment, 7 BROOKLYN L. REV.
247 (1937).
169. 2 STAT. AT LARGE, Ch. 133, pp. 195-197 (1705). Its application to sister
states was recognized in McCullough v. Young, 1 Binn. 63 (Pa. 1803).
170. Brodie v. Bickley, 2 Rawle 431 (Pa. 1830).
171. Act of March 15, 1832.
172. Act of June 16, 1836 (exception made for stock of Pennsylvania corporations).
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enough exceptions were added so that in effect broad powers were
granted.' 73 Thus, by the mere filing of an affidavit stating that the estate
which he represented was not indebted to any Pennsylvania creditor, a
foreign fiduciary could transfer, assign, and reecive the intereston the following: any public debt of Pennsylvania or its political sub-divisions, debts
of national banks situated in Pennsylvania and mortgages on real estate in
Permsylvania. 174 He .could also issue scire facias on all judgments on
which the decedent's creditor's lien was about to expire.' 75 If he was a
testamentary trustee or personal representative, in addition to the affidavit
regarding creditors, he had to file a certified copy of the will or his certificate of appointment, but he did not have to raise ancillary administration
to exercise the above powers. 76 He had the right to sell real estate in
Pennsylvania, when the decedent had specifically given that power in his
will.'7
By an amendment in 1937 these powers were enlarged so that
upon the filing of the affidavit the foreign fiduciary was entitled to foreclose on a mortgage and to receive all moneys, goods, stocks, bonds and
78
choses in action which were owned by the decedent.'
One crucial area remained in which it was necessary for the foreign
fiduciary to raise ancillary administration. The Act failed to give the
foreign fiduciary the right to sue in Pennsylvania courts to enforce the
rights granted under the Act except in the case of foreclosing mortgages
and reviving prior judgments. 17 9 As a result a single recalcitrant debtor
could virtually force ancillary administration thereby negating the entire
purpose of the Act.'8 0 Section 1101 of the Act of 1949 specifically remedies
this defect by giving a foreign fiduciary the right to "institute proceedings
in this commonwealth . . . and to exercise all other powers of a similar
local fiduciary," provided only that he file an exemplified copy of his
appointment, the will, and an affidavit stating after a diligent search he has
found no creditors in Pennsylvania.' s ' When these two requirements are
fulfilled a foreign fiduciary has the same power as a local fiduciary.' 82
173. Act of 1917, §§991-1001
174. Act of 1917, § 991.
175. Act of 1917, § 995.
176. Ibid.
177. Act of 1917, § 996. This power could not be exercised until one year after
the death of decedent.
178. P.L. 2758, § 1, 1937. Incorporated into § 995.
179. Act of 1917, § 997.
180. Mansfield v. McFarland, 212 Pa. 173, 51 At. 763 (1902); Elmer v. Hall.
148 Pa. 345, 23 AtI. 971 (1892).
181. § 1101. A surprising practical result of the requirement of exemplified copies
has been to make it more expensive to furnish the necessary proofs under the present
Act than it was under the Act of 1917. In order to get an exemplified copy of the
will or his appointment a foreign fiduciary must: (1) have the domiciliary Register
of Wills certify that the copy is true and correct; (2) have a judge of the
domiciliary equivalent of the Orphans' Court certify the Register's act; (3) have
a clerk of the court certify the Judge's act. In gathering this triple hearsay the
foreign fiduciary must pay a small fee at each stage. The results of this procedure
are sometimes ludicrous, as in Camden county where the same official performs all
three functions, and are always time-consuming since it is a rare foreign fiduciary
who manages to tag all three bases the first trip around.
182. Itis to be noted that the definition of "foreign fiduciary" does not include
a non-resident fiduciary of a local estate." (§ 101-7) None of the provisions of
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An outstanding feature of the 1949 Act is Section 1102 which permits
a foreign fiduciary to transfer stock in a Pennsylvania corporation by
merely submitting his certificate of appointment without complying with
the other requirements of Section 1101. This provision has resulted in
substantial savings in time and expense. During the last year, in the county
of Philadelphia alone, foreign fiduciaries have been able to transfer stock
in 2500 cases without making a search for creditorsJ 8 3 Creditors can
prevent the transfer of such assets only by exercising their right to force
ancillary administration. 8 4 The liberality of this section has been criticized
on the grounds that the right to enforce ancillary administration affords
no real protection since many creditors are ignorant of this power. Further, since the Act does not require the fiduciary to wait any particular
period of time before exercising his powers under Section 1102,18s a diligent
fiduciary might be able to remove the stock before the creditors could bring
ancillary administration. As a result this section will frequently force the
creditor to go to the domiciliary state to press his claim. The proponents
of this section contend that the talk of protecting Pennsylvania creditors
simply confuses the issue since the most "protection" Pennsylvania was
able to afford creditors even when full ancillary administration was required in every case was to save them the expense of going to the domiciliary jurisdiction to press their claims.' 86 The choice then is between
Article XI specifically covers this situation. The Act of 1917 provided that the
court could in its discretion refuse to appoint as fiduciary of a local estate any nonresident of the Commonwealth, or could appoint a resident co-fiduciary to act in conjunction with any non-resident fiduciary. The present Act raises a question as to
whether this practice will be continued.
183. Information obtained from the Register of Wills Office, Philadelphia
County.
184. The present Act does not in terms give the Pennsylvania creditors the right
to force ancillary administration but this right is implicit in the fact that none of the
powers granted by § 1101 can be exercised if the fiduciary is unable to file an affidavit
that there are no Pennsylvania creditors. See Colmnissioner's Comment to that section. In view of the consistent development of Pennsylvania case law to the effect
that it is error to remit Pennsylvania creditors to the domiciliary jurisdiction where
there are Pennsylvania assets (see note 186, infra) it would seem to follow that
the right to force would extend to the case where the decedent's only asset in Pennsylvania is stock in Pennsylvania corporations as to which no affidavit is required.
185. The month waiting period required by § 1101 does not apply.
186. For obvious constitutional reasons no attempt has ever been made to give
Pennsylvania creditors any priority over domiciliary creditors in assets located in
Pennsylvania when the estate is insolvent. When there is ancillary administration
the practice has been to adjudicate and distribute the claims of Pennsylvania creditors in Pennsylvania if the estate is solvent, remitting the balance to the domiciliary
jurisdiction. Where the estate is insolvent, the practice has been to adjudicate Pennsylvania claims here but to suspend payment until informed how much of the Pennsylvania assets are needed by the domiciliary jurisdiction in order to afford an
equitable distribution of all the decedent's assets among all of his creditors. In this
connection see Hopkins Estate, 28 D. & C. 431 (1936) ; Middiebury's Estate, 249
Pa. 203, 207, 94 Atl. 820, 822 (1915) ; Dent's Appeal, 22 Pa. 514, 520 (1854): Well's
Estate, 161 Pa. 218, 223, 28 Atl. 1116, 1118 (1894). The net saving to the Pennsylvania creditor by ancillary administration, then, is that the creditor doesn't have
to go to the domiciliary state to press his claim. This saving has been regarded as
so important by the court that it has been held not to be within the court's discretion to remit Pennsylvania creditors to the domiciliary jurisdiction where there are
assets in Pennsylvania, Hopkins Estate, .mpra.
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imposing on all foreign estates the expense and delay of making a search
for creditors in order to save a few unwary creditors the expense of a trip
to the domiciliary jurisdiction or simply permitting the fiduciaries to remove the assets upon submission of their certificate, letting the burden of
his own unwariness fall upon the creditor who has failed to exercise his
right to force ancillary administration. Since both of these arguments
apply to all types of assets, the contrast between Section 1102 and the rest
of Article XI may well be considered a compromise between the above two
schools of thought. The proposed 1951 amendment to the '49 Act expands
Section 1102 to include "stocks, bonds and other securities of a Pennsylvania corporation or of a federal corporation located in Pennsylvania," and
makes a significant change in allowing the foreign fiduciary to receive divi87
dends thereon.1
The contrast between Section 1102 and the remainder of Article XI
also raises the question of why a distinction should be made between the
proof of authority necessary to transfer Pennsylvania stock under Section
1102, and the proof necessary to transfer assets under Article XI generally.
For Section 1102, a certificate of appointment only is necessary; for Article
XI generally, production of an exemplified copy of the will or probate
proceedings in which the fiduciary was appointed is necessary. Since the
purpose to be served in both situations is to prevent fraud upon the
decedent's estate, no logical reason for the distinction suggests itself. If
the mere submission of the certificate of appointment affords adequate protection in the case of stock transfers, it would be more in accord with the
liberal spirit of the Act to permit this simplified method of proof whenever
personal property is involved.' 88
The 1917 Act specifically provided that foreign fiduciaries could sell
when given power in the will,' s 9 and although the 1949 Act has no such
provision, there can be little doubt that the broad powers given by Article
XI would permit a sale by a foreign fiduciary in such a case. Where there
is no power of sale in the will the foreign fiduciary can sell under the 1949
Act if the law of the domiciliary jurisdiction provides for sale without order
of court. Where the will does not specifically give the foreign fiduciary
the power of sale and where the laws of the domiciliary jurisdiction require
a court order before sale, Article XI presents a question as to whether a
Pennsylvania or foreign court must give the order. The answer depends
on the interpretation given to the requirement that a foreign fiduciary must
not exercise any powers not granted in his domiciliary jurisdiction. An
187. PA. SaN. Bill No. 5 (1951).
188. Since the law of the situs governs the disposition of real property, no disposition of Pennsylvania realty by a will which did not meet the requirements of
a Pennsylvania -i.0 would be effective. Hence there is a valid basis for requiring
the foreign fiduciary to produce the will before exercising any power over Pennsylvania realty. But where only personalty is involved the requirement that the foreign
fiduciary produce an exemplified copy of both the will and the probate proceedings
seems unnecessary if it is assumed as it is in § 1102 that the certificate of appointment
is sufficient proof of the fiduciaries authority to protect the estate from fraud.
189. Act of 1917, § 996.
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argument could be made that if the fiduciary got an order from the Pennsylvania courts he would not be exceeding the powers granted by the
domiciliary jurisdiction because he is not selling real estate without an
"order of court." The fact that only a Pennsylvania court can effectively
order the sale of Pennsylvania real estate would tend to support this interpretation. The concept that a court of one state can not enlarge the powers
granted to a fiduciary appointed in another state 10 might, however, force
the court to hold that the foreign fiduciary must get the permission of his
own court before selling real estate. A practical consideration behind this
view is that it is usually in the domiciliary state where the bulk of creditors
are located and hence the domiciliary court is in a better position to determine whether the sale is necessary. When the problem actually arises, it
might be cheaper in the long run for the foreign fiduciary to take out ancillary administration so that he could exercise the same powers, with regard
to the sale of land, as possessed by local fiduciaries.
The 1917 Act made no provision for voluntary payments to foreign
fiduciaries. However, the cases have held that, in the absence of creditors,
legatees, or heirs within the state, a debtor can pay without subsequent
liability to an ancillary administrator. Section 1105 of the 1949 Act protects a debtor even though there are creditors within this state by releasing
him from any further liability when he has changed his position in reliance
on any of the powers granted to foreign fiduciaries by this Act.
190. See Jones Estate, 28 Pa. Dist. 282 (1928).
(Pennsylvania Orphans'
Court cannot give authority to sell land when the will does not give that power).

